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Abstract  
There is a tension between democracy, which is limited to the nation-state, and human 
rights, which are universal and point to the ideal republic. The Charter of Fundamental 
Human Rights of the European Union is an important step in the process of 
institutionalising a framework of a cosmopolitan order where violations of human rights 
can be persecuted as criminal offences according to legal procedures. The principle of 
popular sovereignty is on its way to be transformed into a law for the citizens of the 
world. But as the process of Europeansation is tainted with juridification and executive 
dominance the EU is in need of democratization. The citizens have obtained rights but 
they have not been able to give these rights to themselves. The protracted Constitution-
making process of the EU testifies to a promising yet unaccomplished mission of 
democratization. 
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It was in Europe the modern system of states was invented and it is Europe that has come 
farthest in changing it. We witness a significant development of rights and law 
enforcement beyond the nation state. Processes of institution building at the European 
level are challenging the fundamental building blocs of democratic rule in Europe and 
constrain the will power of the states. Consider for example the sanctions imposed on 
Austria in 2000 by the fourteen other Member States for letting Haider’s Freedom Party - 
a rightwing, ‘racist’ party - into government. It was the Member States that decided to 
impose sanctions against Austria - in line with Article 7 (TEU). The EU has now 
amended this article to ensure that breaches of fundamental principles can be sanctioned. 
That a new order is underway is perhaps most clearly revealed in the initiative taken to 
make a Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
It is the sovereignty of the modern state as laid down in the Westphalian order in 
1648 that is at stake with the institutionalization of human rights beyond the nation state. 
With this Treaty, the rulers’ external sovereignty was safeguarded and the international 
order became founded on the principles of co-existence and non-interference among 
sovereign states. Prohibition of violence against sovereign states was here prioritized over 
the protection of human rights. This principle can not prohibit genocide or other crimes 
against humanity.  It is a principle that has protected the most odious regimes. To 
illustrate, it was only when Hitler-Germany attacked Poland that World War II broke out, 
not when the persecution of Jews started.
 This also indicates the limitations of nationally 
founded and confined democracy. While human rights are universal and refer to 
humanity as such, democracy refers to a particular community of legal consociates who 
come together to make binding collective decisions. The validity of the laws is derived 
from the legislative processes of a sovereign community. The propensity to adopt rights, 
then, depends on the quality of the political process in a particular community. But a 
particular state may fail to respect the rights and liberties of their citizens as well as other 
states’ legitimate interests. Even though the contradiction between rights and democracy 
is, in principle, a false one, since there can be no democracy without the protection of 
individual rights, and since rights are not valid unless they have been democratically 
enacted; in practical terms there is a contradiction as democracy is only institutionalised 
  3at the level of the nation state – as ‘a national community of faith’ that autonomously 
govern itself. Democracy depends on particular states with very different political 
cultures, which are geared toward self-maintenance: the primary responsibility of the 
decision-makers is their own constituency. Hence, democracies may be illiberal.  To 
resolve this tension cosmopolitan democracy where actors see themselves as citizens of 
the world and not merely of their countries is required.  
In this article I ask whether the rights development at the European level, in the 
EU, can close the gap between abstract human rights and the need for democratic 
legitimation. In Europe, the states of a conflict-ridden continent have domesticated 
international relations among themselves through a process with strong traits of 
juridification and executive dominance. The lingering question is whether the ensuing 
order can be democratic, which I examine with regard to the recent development of 
bringing democracy to bear on the EU. I conclude that the present constitutinalization 
process – the process of forging a Constitutional Treaty – is testimony of an unfinished 
process of democratization. 
 
Juridification and Executive dominance  
In the last decades we have witnessed a significant development of rights and law 
enforcement beyond the nation state that bypasses democratic control. Juridification 
denotes the expansion of legal norms and the accompanying system of adjudication to 
new domains of social life. It depicts law’s expansion and differentiation as well as 
increased conflict resolution through legal means.
1 It implies the imposition of a 
cooperative scheme upon others who cannot influence or revise the terms.
2 Even though 
the development of the European community is a prime example of juridification beyond 
the nation state as citizens are being subjected to regulations stemming from Community 
law-making and intergovernmental proceedings, the problem it is not confined to Europe.  
Regulatory institutions such as the WTO, the World Bank and the IMF impose a 
scheme of global economic cooperation on the basis of inter-state bargaining. However, 
there is also an increasing amount of judicial procedures at the international level set up 
to adjudicate in disputes over breaches of international law. “The diplomatic dispute 
settlement procedures under GATT, for instance have been replaced by a judicial dispute 
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punish, states that do not fulfil their commitments.”
3 We are witnessing the expansion of 
rule of law principle internationally complementing the domestic one, in areas such as 
international trade, security, labour, and environmental law.
4   
Similarly, human rights are institutionalised in international courts, in tribunals 
and increasingly also in politico-judicial bodies over and above the state that control 
resources for enforcing norm compliance. Examples are the rights embedded in the UN 
system, the international criminal tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, The 
Hague Court of Justice, The International Criminal Court, and the European Court of 
Justice. European states have incorporated ‘The European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’ and many of its protocols into their 
domestic legal systems. Thus legal developments over the last century have been 
remarkable and one of their main thrusts has been to protect human rights. Today, almost 
nobody can be treated as a stranger devoid of rights as legal entitlements are being 
entrenched in power wielding systems of action as well as in the actual policies pursued.  
There are no lawless areas left.
5  Aggressors can be tried for crimes against humanity, 
and offensive wars are criminalized: Sometimes human rights protection trumps state 
sovereignty. The NATO war against Serbia in 1999 to protect an innocent population was 
formally illegal according to the UN Charter, but was declared legitimate by the 
Independent International Commission on Kosovo 2000.  
Today, thus, for (at least some) states to be recognized as sovereign they have to 
respect basic civil and political rights. In principle, then, only a democratic state is a 
sovereign state and in such a state the majority can not suppress minorities. Moreover, as 
states have become increasingly interdependent and intertwined - as they have to 
cooperate in order to realize their interests - the parameters of power politics have 
changed.
6 Hence the supreme principle of the state is no longer merely survival – salus 
populi suprema lex est. The very concept of sovereignty has changed, from denoting the 
supreme legal authority of the state to uphold the law within a certain territory and being 
independent from any external authority
7, to one that subject state power to higher order 
principles. A UN panel writes:  
  5“In signing the Charter of the United Nations, States not only benefit from the 
privileges of sovereignty but also accept its responsibilities. Whatever perceptions 
have prevailed when the Westphalian system first gave rise to the notion of State 
sovereignty, today it clearly carries with it the obligation of a state to protect the 
welfare of its own peoples and meet its obligations to the wider international 
community.”
8  
However positive by moral standards such a development is, it does not harmonize with 
the democratic idea that the people should be making the laws they are to obey. At the 
international arena, human rights are not democratically enacted. The new situation is 
marked by lack of democratic accountability, by juridification, technocratic governance 
and executive dominance. Juridification denotes that the citizens have obtained rights and 
can sue the authorities but they have not been able to give these rights to themselves. 
Even slaves and children enjoy rights. The positivisation of human rights is in need of 
democratization as there should be no humanitarization without representation. 
The principle of democracy can be pinned down to two basic criteria: congruence 
and accountability. By congruence is meant the basic democratic principle that those 
affected by laws should also be authorized to make them. Accountability designates that 
the decision-makers can be held responsible by the citizenry and that, in the last resort, it 
is possible to dismiss incompetent rulers. Thus, in order for a polity to be democratically 
legitimate, it must, at a minimum, be organized in such a way that there is free access to 
the public realm, that governmental positions are open to all, that those who govern are 
appointed by election  at regular intervals and their actions subjected to public scrutiny 
and judicial review. These principles are threatened by today’s executive prominence, 
which denotes the net empowerment of the executive branch of states at the expense of 
parliamentary involvement and popular control. This applies when legislative assemblies 
and the general public are unable to put decision-makers to account. The inscrutability of 
decision makers at the international level due to lack of transparency exempt the 
executives of justificatory requirements and gives them an advantage in terms of 
information, which they can make use of in a technocratic way.
 
Today, citizens’ interests are affected by processes of denationalization and 
globalization in ways and by bodies which are difficult to hold responsible via the ballot 
  6box.
9 There is no longer overlap between decision-making participants and affected 
parties. Denationalisation shatters the two symmetries necessary for effective 
participation, first between the citizens and the decision-makers that ‘… they are to hold 
to account, and secondly between the “output” (decisions, policies and so on) of decision-
makers and their constituents’.
10 Without input congruence, participation in making the 
decisions that affect one, there can be no self-determination; and without output 
congruence, without overlap between the polity and the territory it controls, there can be 
no effective participation.  
In a ‘globalized’, denationalized world the requirements of legitimacy and of 
efficiency, of input and output congruence, no longer coincide. Those who can be kept 
accountable have little control over the factors affecting peoples’ lives, and those who 
have the decisive power are beyond democratic reach. The quest for post-national 
democracy then is due to the problem of handling juridification beyond the nation state, 
and it is a problem that stems from the problem of institutionalizing human rights 
correctly. As it is impossible to be fully democratic within a non-democratic world order, 
what is needed at the international level is not merely an intergovernmental organization 
that ensures observance of peace and human rights but rather a supranational body able to 
adjudicate in the name of all: an authoritative third party that acts as an mediator, 
arbitrator and judge.
11 This requires a union of states bound by a constitution and not just 
a “permanent congress of states” – such as the League of Nations - as Kant foresaw; 
because “(J)just how the permanence of this union, on which “civilized” resolution of 
international conflict depends, can be guaranteed without the legally binding character of 
an institution analogous to a state constitution Kant never explains”.
12 The point is then 
barely that peace is only feasible among democratic states, but moreover that the union of 
states must itself be democratic in one form or the other. This is the background for the 
need of democratic orders over and above the nation state - the need for a legislative 
entity, which can give and change norms at the international level, of which the EU is the 
most prominent representative. 
 
Polity-building beyond the nation state 
  7The EU has sustained a rapid expansion of political regulation in Europe and has over a 
period of fifty years transformed the political landscape in a profound manner. 
Integration has deepened as a wide range of new policy fields have been subjected to 
integrated action and collective decision-making. This has taken place not only with 
regard to trade, monetary and business regulation, fishing and agriculture but also with 
regard to foodstuff production, gene- and bio-technology, labor rights, environmental 
protection, culture, tourism, immigration, police and home affairs and now also with 
regard to a common foreign and security policy. The EU has succeeded in entrenching 
peace and it has established a Single Market, a Monetary Union - the Euro - a European 
citizenship and a (not ratified) Constitutional Treaty (CT). Even though the powers of the 
Union in many policy areas - such as social and tax policy - are severely restricted, a 
significant amount of laws and amendments in the nation states stem from the binding 
EU decisions, directives and regulations. The EU appears to have reached a stable 
political form based on a material constitution.  
It has also widened and has successfully managed to include new members.  The 
prospect of membership has made a huge contribution to regional stability, prosperity and 
has proved to be a very effective instrument for advancing democracy, rule of law and 
security. All applicant states have to incorporate the acquis communautaire – the body of 
EU’s legal norms - and the accession criteria for membership included democracy and 
human rights in addition to administrative and economic ones. There has been a 
fundamental domestic change in response to EU rules and regulations.
13  
The EU at present consists of 27 member states and wields influence over states 
and citizens through such supranational institutions as the Commission, the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ), the Parliament (the EP) as well as through the intergovernmental 
Council - the most powerful body. The present state of affairs is due to a protracted process 
of integration. Since its inception the basis for cooperation has deepened and broadened, as 
reflected in the founding Treaties: from the Paris (1951) and Rome (1957) Treaties, 
through the Single European Act (1986), Maastricht (1992), Amsterdam (1997), Nice 
(2000), up to the Laeken declaration (2001) and the present-day work on forging a 
Constitutional Treaty (2002-2005). The supranational character of the legal structure of 
the EU started with the acceptance of a constitutional reading of the founding treaties, 
  8already in the 1950s, and explicitly in the 1960s,
14 which transformed the EC from an 
international regime into a quasi-federal legal system based on the precepts of higher 
law-constitutionalism. This was synthetised by the European Court of Justice in the 
combined doctrines of direct effect (which affirms the full legal character, under certain 
conditions, of EC norms- first explicated in relation to Treaty provisions, later said to 
apply also to directives in the 1970s- and consequently implies that such norms might 
grant rights to European citizens qua  Europeans) and supremacy of Union law (first 
explicated by the ECJ in 1964, and which states that national norms must give way to 
Community ones if an irreducible conflict arises within the scope of application of the 
Treaties). This has been coupled with the growth of the number of EU provisions and 
Court rulings, where the Court acts as a trustee of the Treaty and not as an agent of the 
member states.  
The net upshot is that the requisite third party, in the form of an arbitrator but not 
in the form of a democratic legislative entity, has been established in Europe. (However, 
since 1995 the dispute-settlement mechanism of WTO has, as mentioned, also become 
independent of the contracting parties). What started out as piecemeal problem-solving 
for the member states - underpinned by the peace motive - has ended up in a 
supranational order subjecting the constituent parts to collectively binding decisions. The 
unbridled sovereigns authorized by the Westphalian order are now brought under the rule 
of a supra-national polity which disposes of an authoritative dispute resolution 
mechanism.  
 
Direct legitimacy  
Integration started with the institutionalization of a ‘High Authority’- the Commission – 
with some regulatory competence as a third party distinct from the contracting parties.
15 
However, the legitimacy of the EU was still derived from the member states; it was 
initially indirect, and, like any international organization, depending on its ability to 
produce outcomes. But today the democratic legitimacy of the member states cannot be 
established independently of the EU because they have become so deeply enmeshed that 
the pattern of legitimate authority in the states has been transformed. 
  9The EU is clearly something less than a federation but more than an international 
organization, a club, a ‘Zweckbundnis’ (Verband), regime or a confederation where the 
member states are the contracting parties. To the latter democratic criteria do not apply as 
it is the states not the citizens that make up the ‘constituencies’; states are the sole sources 
of legitimacy and they act internationally on indirect and delegated powers on 
governance functions. Here, ‘constitutions’ are contracts as ‘the pouvoir constituant‘ is 
structured as a juridical relationship between separate parties: a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ 
presupposing individual membership and sovereignty and where the signatories represent 
individual modalities of government, rather than a social pact among the citizens. 
Contractual based orders do not put up normative criteria of political legitimacy.
16
In contrast to such orders the EU has become a polity that subscribes to 
democracy and human rights as legitimating criteria. It also disposes of an organized 
capacity to act – to make collectively binding decisions. EU decisions impinge on 
national priorities, influence the domestic allocation of resources and constrain the 
sovereignty and autonomy of the states. The EU performs functions that affect interests 
and identities all over Europe. In fact, the EU, which is a creature of the member states, 
has contributed to transform them, either directly or through unleashing processes of 
mutual learning and adaptation. The identity as well as the statehood of European states 
stem from their European-ness as national law has become entangled with EU law 
practice to the degree that the states are no longer merely ‘nation states’. The collective 
self-conception of nation states has changed as they have become ‘Member States’ with 
rights and duties so that they can not serve as the source of their own legitimacy 
independently of the EU. Their legal identity has been Europeanized. 
Union transactions are thus not merely functional problem-solving – they have 
turned ‘political’. The presence of market-correcting or positive integration measures, 
such as certain redistributive schemes and means of standard-setting; the increased use of 
qualified majority voting testify to the EU as a system of dominance revolving around 
more than the ‘low politics’ or politics of the lowest common denominator. The European 
integration project, as many have pointed out, cannot be understood simply as a win-win 
situation, nor is this project merely about solving the perceived problems of the member 
states in line with the Pareto criterion.
17  
  10 However, the EU has not only embraced democratic standards it has also taken 
measures to rectify the democratic deficiencies. This has happened through a decades-
long process in which EU institutions, notably the ECJ and the EP, member state 
governments and parliaments, social movements and popular pressure, have moved the 
EU into a post-national polity aspiring to direct legitimacy: the power wielding 
institutions should be authorized by the people and be accountable to the affected parties 
directly. This is seen first of all in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which is the most 
explicit commitment as of yet to a full blown political union founded on democracy, rule 
of law and human rights - a rights-based citizens’ Union.
18 It was drafted by a political 
body, which referred to itself as a Convention, set up to consolidate the fundamental 
rights to be protected by the EU (based on the existing acquis communitaire) and it 
managed to work without major difficulties and produce a consensual result.
19 The 
Convention method is based on broad participation - a majority of the members were 
parliamentarians who acted on an open mandate - on public debate, on procedures for 
deliberation rather than decision-making through crude bargaining at Intergovernmental 
Conferences (IGCs), which is the usual way of making Treaty changes. 
  
Chartering Europe 
At the December 2000 Summit in Nice, the Charter was solemnly proclaimed and was 
picked up by the Laeken process and the Convention on the Future of Europe, which 
started its work in February 2002 and completed its activities in June/July 2003.
20 This 
so-called Constitutional Convention succeeded in forging agreement on a single 
constitutional proposal 2003 - a draft Constitutional Treaty (CT), which the IGC 
accepted (with some minor amendments) in June 2004, (but which was rejected in two 
referendums in France and Nederland spring 2005). The CT incorporated the Charter of 
Fundamental rights into the Constitution. All articles on the rights of EU citizens in the 
Treaty of the Union have now been collected in one document of 54 articles, inspired by 
the ‘The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms’ (ECHR) (without replacing it), the Social Charters adopted by the Council of 
Europe and by the Community and the case-law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ).  
  11The Charter contains provisions on civil, political, social and economic rights. Put 
together, these are intended to ensure the dignity of the person, to safeguard essential 
freedoms, to provide a European citizenship, to ensure equality, to foster solidarity, and 
to provide for justice. The number and range of rights that are listed are comprehensive. 
The Charter enumerates several ‘rights to solidarity’ – hence, the protection of social 
rights is now included as a basic commitment for the Union - even though the realisation 
of these is not within the actual competence of the Union. They nevertheless constitute 
vital reasons to except market freedoms in the pursuit of social and redistributive goals.
21 
Thus, the EU can no longer be seen merely as a market project, if it ever could. In 
addition to provisions which most charters and bills of rights hold and which pertain to 
such clauses as the right to life, security, dignity there are numerous articles that seek to 
respond directly to contemporary issues and challenges (including abolition of death 
penalty, prohibition of cloning, protection of intellectual property).  
  Even though the Charter is not as yet legally binding, ‘(i)n practice, (…) the legal 
effect of the solemn proclamation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union will tend to be similar to that of its insertion into the Treaties on which the Union 
is founded’.
22 The Charter reflects the well established rights and value-basis of the 
Community.
23 Moreover, since it consolidates existing positive law in one sense it may 
be seen as already binding. It has also increased its legal bite over a short period of time 
as the Court of first Instance has invoked the Charter as legal authority in several 
judgments.
24 It has been referred to by institutional actors like the European Ombudsman 
and the Commission, and most Advocates-General of the European Court of Justice have 
also made use of provisions of the Charter as legal grounds of their opinions. AG Mischo 
went further and commented that: 
 ‘I know that the Charter is not legally binding, but it is worthwhile referring to it 
given that it constitutes the expression, at the highest level, of a democratically 
established political consensus on what must today be considered as the catalogue 
of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Community legal order.’
25
Bills of rights empower the judges to protect liberty and hinder that democracy by means 
of majority vote crushes individual rights. It is the protection of individual rights and the 
constraints on state autonomy that marks the normative basis of the European 
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 26  This is reflected in the early decisions of the ECJ on direct 
effect and supremacy, in the conditionality clause (all aid and trade agreements are 
conditional on respect for human rights), in gender-equality and citizenship-rights 
policies, a process culminating with the Charter of Fundamental Rights; whose preamble 
states that “…. [T]the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human 
dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; it is based on the principles of democracy and 
the rule of law. It places the individual at the heart of its activities, by establishing the 
citizenship of the Union and by creating an area of freedom, security and justice.” 
The individual is in the process of being liberated from the confines of the nation 
state as institutions above the nation-state are now in place with the competence to 
constrain the internal willpower of the state, i.e., the power exerted over its citizens. By 
this, international law is pushed beyond the limitations of the Charter of the United 
Nations, which on its behalf prohibits violence, and thus aggression against other states, 
but forbids the intervention in the internal affairs of a state (Article 2.7). A true republic 
certainly depends on bodies above the nation state that citizens can appeal to when their 
rights are threatened, but can such bodies be democratic? This is a question much 
neglected in the peace-through-law-movement spearheaded by Hans Kelsen.
27
 
Re-democratization 
In Europe the EU testifies to political initiatives that have resulted in supra-national 
institutions, which has shown a remarkable and unprecedented capacity to take on new 
collective measures and deepen integration. But, as I already claimed supra, this process 
of Europeansation is tainted with juridification and executive dominance. It is a process 
that has sapped parliamentary sovereignty at the member state level, and the question is 
whether democracy at the European level can compensate for this.  
The ongoing process of rights’ entrenchment in the EU comes close to a 
constitutionalizing one. From a cosmopolitan point of view such a development is 
important as it contributes to establish democratically controlled institutions at the 
regional level to cope with unattended problems. State and world citizenship form a 
continuum as people increasingly are affected by supranational powers. The EU can 
usefully be conceived of as an intermediate institution for grappling with exigencies 
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regulation. The EU is an entity with strong supranational elements equipped with an 
organized capacity to act and it has now undertaken steps to reduce the democratic deficit. 
The method adopted in 1999 by the Union for establishing the Charter offered a 
blueprint for an alternative mode of Treaty change which, after the Nice fiasco, became 
the role model for the so-called Laeken Convention of 2002-2003. Its membership was 
modeled on the Charter Convention, with a majority of parliamentarians. 46 out of 66 
voting members, and 26 out of 39 from the candidate countries were parliamentarians. Its 
mandate was broader, its working method included working groups, and the applicant 
states had a number of representatives present, as active, participating, observers. Also 
this Convention had a distinctive deliberative mark, as opposed to the hitherto closed, 
secretive and executive-driven intergovernmental mode of treaty change.
28 It succeeded 
in establishing a draft Constitutional Treaty (CT) which was signed by the Council 29 
October 2004, and which contains measures aimed at mending the EU’s legitimacy gap. 
This includes, in addition to the mentioned incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, the strengthening of the EP and of the national parliaments, the right to initiate a 
legislative proposal, the generalization of co-decision and qualified majority voting as 
decision-making procedures. Further, the CT adopts a constitutional language for 
legislation as it changes from the terminology of regulations and directives to laws and 
frameworks law corresponding to national practice (Article I-33).
29  It depicts the EU as a 
supranational polity based on a dual principle of legitimation: It is both a Union of states 
and of citizens. The CT has been ratified by 13 states, but were rejected in two referenda 
– in France and Nederland June 2005 – and in July the European leaders resolved that 
there should be a ‘reflection break’ and postponed the time for the final ratification.  
Neither the Charter Convention nor the Laeken Convention did have a 
satisfactory popular mandate and is thus problematic in democratic terms.
30 But the 
Charter consolidates in a synthetic fashion the acquis communitaire on the protection of 
fundamental rights, and as such, its legitimacy is grounded on the constitutional traditions 
common to the Member States, whose democratic credentials are beyond doubt. 
Moreover, as most of those participating in the consolidation exercise were 
parliamentarians, the concrete text of the Charter can claim a democratic legitimacy 
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made through open deliberation by representatives fare better than one based on judicial 
activism and closed-door inter-state bargaining. However, even though democracy is 
internally related to rights - as there is no democracy without the protection of the 
fundamental rights of the individual - it is only through a democratic process of law 
enactment that we can know which rights are right, and how they should be delineated. It 
takes public deliberation to justify rights as democracy requires membership and 
participation in the very structures that affect individual interests. This is why the two 
aforementioned processes were unsatisfactory from a democratic point of view. On the 
other hand, democracy always entails undemocratic stipulations in the first place: it 
presupposes elements – in particular a demos and some rights - that are not subject to 
democratic decision-making. 
Post-national democracy 
What is new and interesting about the EU is its alleged democratic features even though 
the integration process has mainly taken place through law. The EU has become a more 
democratic institution because members of the Parliament are directly elected by citizens 
in the member states, (and the use of QMV has eroded the ability of individual countries 
to hold up new legislation). The ECJ has been a driving force in the political development 
of the EU and has independently strengthened the role of the European Parliament (EP). 
It has subjected the EP’s decisions to substantive judicial review and thus has 
strengthened and authorized the view of it as an autonomous political body within the 
Union. Initially the EP was a consultative body - a talk shop - with very limited powers 
and made up foremost of representatives of national parliaments. Over time, and in 
particular after the introduction of direct election of MEPs in 1979, its decision-making 
powers have grown.
31 The EP increased its status and power with the Single European 
Act, which marked a watershed as the cooperation procedure was introduced, then 
reinforced by the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaty, which transformed the EP from a 
secondary institution to an important legislative actor.
32 It has now achieved co-decision 
making power with the Council in many areas and is increasingly curtailing the power of 
the Commission. Despite the fact that the EP is not an agenda setter – this is the 
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powers of national parliaments it has changed from being a Parliament in the name to act 
like one.  
The Constitutional Convention to a large degree embraced the parliamentary 
model of democratic legitimacy. It is the parliamentarian form of democracy - at the 
national and European level - that has carried the day in the reform process. Bluntly, 
democratizing the Union means parliamentarization. Now, this may be puzzling and 
indeed imply a technocratic ‘overstretch of democratic resources’. As there is no 
European people – no demos - full parliamentarization of the EU is not possible 
according to many analysts.
33 The constitution-making subject is missing according to 
the no-demos thesis’ proponents.
34  Without a collective identity symbolized by a people, 
there can be no authority conferred upon a government to rule in the name of all. Such 
make up the so-called non-majoritarian sources of legitimacy – or the socio-cultural 
substrate - that makes collective decision making possible. Majority rule rests upon 
allegiance and a notion of solidarity that is only conceivable in terms the symbolic 
establishment of a demos – a people – founded on a sense of unity and allegiance. This is 
held to be a precondition for a democratic sovereign capable of collective decision- 
making; for the outvoted minority to abide by the law, for the willingness of the citizens 
to pay for the misfortune of their compatriots. Such a solidaristic substrate is required for 
the formation of a collective identity strong enough to ensure that the compatriots not 
only see themselves as members of a community based on liberty but also as one based 
on equality and solidarity.
35 Solidarity is, however, both the pre-requisite for deliberation 
and collective decision making and a result of such. From a discourse-theoretical point of 
view the question is not merely how much such commonality exists, but also how it can 
be brought about in trust fostering institutions – in inclusive publics of different kinds.
36
As the EU is neither a state nor remotely a nation state there must be another basis 
than pre-political agreement on substantial values and common interests for the 
justification of rights and policymaking. It has been suggested that the inclusive 
procedures constituted by the rights of the citizens to participate and hold to account, can 
bear the burden of legitimation alone. Democracy and human rights, which reflect the 
core cognitive legitimacy basis of nation states, are held be the only viable normative 
  16resource basis for a post-national political order.
37 This refers to the bare bones of the 
constitutional state’s cognitive political principles – rule of law, popular sovereignty and 
citizenship – in contrast to the pre-political we-feeling and allegiance making up the 
existential common ground of nation-hood, of love of country.  
The Union has not been able to plainly ground its actions on what Europe is or 
what it is to be a European. As a collective identity in a strong sense is lacking, 
identification with common concerns can not be taken for granted. Rather it has to be 
created through the political struggle for recognition and justice. The lack of pre-political 
identification with the emerging political community can, in principle, be compensated 
for by a public debate that forms catalytic functions of enlarged citizenship, solidarity, 
and plural identities. The constitutional development of the EU could make for this 
contribution as far as it triggered a European wide debate and thus had an identity 
shaping effect. A profound debate on the constitutional essentials could root the basic 
principles of government in a European-wide civic culture. Establishing the convention 
and a proposal for a European Constitution are vital vehicles of such, because these 
institutions revolve on the basic rules for action coordination and intercultural co-
existence. A cross-border constitutional debate depends, however, on a European public 
sphere that still remains in latency.
38
 
Conclusion 
For the first time in human history, we are now witnessing the development of a 
democratic system that is not based on a conception of a culturally homogenized people, 
or brought about through war or brute force, but one that has emerged through voluntary 
cooperation, through bargaining and deliberation and other trust inducing mechanisms. 
Through this the EU has progressed beyond the initial stage of a purely voluntary 
association and moved into a supranational legal system based on the precepts of higher 
law-constitutionalism endowed with an authoritative dispute mechanism. It is an entity 
equipped with an organized capacity to act and it has now undertaken steps to reduce the 
democratic deficit. All legal persons and not just states have judicially enforceable rights 
and legitimacy established through domestic channels, through national democracy, has 
been supplemented with direct chains of influence. The European Parliament has 
  17obtained more power and majority vote has replaced unanimity as a decision rule in 
several policy fields. Consequently, the EU is both a Union of states and of citizens. 
The EU is a large scale experiment searching for binding constitutional principles 
and institutional arrangements beyond the mode of rule entrenched in the nation state. 
State power is being domesticated by supranational law, and the only legitimacy basis for 
this law is the constitutional developments in Europe that emerged in the wake of the 
French revolution, and which for more than 200 years now has contributed massively to 
the stabilization of nation states. In this tradition constitutions are seen as arrangements 
for respecting the equality and the autonomy of the individual in the realization of the 
idea of popular self-government. The European integration process testifies to a 
promising yet unaccomplished process of democratization that can only be carried 
through by a more encompassing and comprehensive constitutionalizing process than we 
have witnessed so far.  
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